By Joe Johnson (Contributor) – Email
Date Posted: September 16, 2011
Print Edition: September 14, 2011
There were two contributing factors that led to a full blown riot in Vancouver on June 15th, following the Canucks’ game seven loss to Boston. The rioters themselves, and the failed suppression of the unrest. But in the three months following, very little action has been taken on either issue. After Premier Christy Clark made her announcement outside a damaged London Drugs in downtown Vancouver, and the social media blitz that set out to identify the rioters, we are now given three reviews of the events that occurred. The government commissioned Furlong-Keefe review, the VPD review, and the City of Vancouver review. These should be of interest to at least a few of the UFV students who were downtown during the game.
My focus here is the dissection of the first of the three reports to be released, conducted by John Furlong and Douglas Keefe, entitled “The Night the City Became a Stadium”. Everybody is familiar with Furlong, the man behind the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, but Keefe is a little less well-known here on the West Coast. Keefe is a former Nova Scotia deputy attorney general with plenty of experience on government reviews and inquiries. With his skills on government and security integration, Keefe and Furlong have been able to sort through the events which occurred that day.
Essentially, what this 396 page report had found was that there were more people on the streets than the VPD could handle. Many people were also either drunk before they made it downtown, or were openly drinking once they were there. It’s pointed out that a typical venue acts as a mechanism for managing capacity. But the streets were open and the number of people showing up had expanded to roughly 200,000, many from out-of-town. Staggeringly, it is estimated by Translink that “At the peak it delivered about 500 people into downtown every 90 seconds by train alone.” It appears that the city had dropped the ball on estimating the number of people who would be coming into the Fanzone on Georgia Street.
The report also stipulates that the crowd had swelled before the police could begin their “crowd management strategy.” The police had lost the power to control the crowd before the game had even started. It was a slow increase in police presence which presented part of the problem, “The opportunity to set a tone passed before there were enough officers to set it and congestion prevented its later imposition.” The number of police officers present had increased from 446 at the beginning, to a total of 928 by night’s end. To be fair, the report does go on to say that there is no number of police officers that could have prevented the riots. But I’m left questioning how these findings could suggest that if the same number of police had been present much earlier in the day, it would not have had an effect on suppression.
It’s evident from this report that both the city and the VPD exacerbated the situation. There was poor communication and preparation. The strategy worked for games 1 through 6, but it had to have been evident that things could, and would, be far different for the final game. Mistakes were made by all.
I am in no way deferring blame from the people who actually started and participated in the riot, but the problems that had arisen must be identified so that this will never occur again. Furlong and Keefe have taken the same stance in their report, reserving blame only for the rioters. For this, some in the media have called it soft. However, by reading the findings, it is evident where things fell apart.
An open city is not the place for a game seven Stanley Cup final game. This is especially true when the city has a history. But this doesn’t mean such events should never be held again in the future. Instead, steps must be taken to ensure that crowd sizes don’t escalate to such an uncontrollable level. Alcohol consumption should be watched more closely, and those who are clearly intoxicated should be taken care of appropriately. After all, this was a family event.
Some recommendations that stand out include part of the VPD’s management strategy. One such suggestion is managing the crowd size by monitoring transit volumes and using aerial imagery. There should also be contingency plans set up to allow for an earlier presence if required, and contingency plans for multiple incidents and locations. Clear communication and briefings with external agencies should be improved. Integration should be furthered between police, fire, and the Public Safety Unit tactical units to better tackle burning cars as well as aid people.
When it comes to regional planning, the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General, through corroboration with police, fire, and other services, should be the overseeing body. If the event is deemed regional, services from all regions should be involved in creating a cohesive plan. Finally, they also make the recommendation that a review be made on the requirement in which the mayor must serve as chair on the police board. This point is very interesting as they are calling into question the conflict of interest that may be present.
With regards to alcohol, some of these recommendations include the consideration of legislation that would prohibit it on transit systems. Another involving legislation would be stronger penalties for drinking at public events. As well, they make the recommendation for stronger public education programs.
The repercussions for the riot are wide reaching. There is more at stake than the losses of merchandise and the cost of repairs to businesses. The world witnessed this event. It may easily result in the loss of tourism dollars, or possibly a further downgrade as one of the best cities in the world! I consider these growing pains, and as Vancouver continues to mature as a world class city, hopefully we will see the end of this kind of behaviour.
